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ABSTRACT 
Brand alliances are more widespread than current academic research would seem to suggest, and the 
reality seems to indicate dIat dlÍs type of alliances between companies will undergo unsuspected growtll 
in the years to come. This paper will attempt to help fill this literature gap by analyzing and developing 
the concept of the brand aIliance on dIe basis of Williamson's transaction cost theory and the brand 
identity lllodels presented by Aaker (1996), Upshaw (1995) and Kapferer (1992). In addition, it will 
discuss the problems inherent in this type of aIliance, primarily as regards complementarily and 
cOllsistency between the brands. To this end, an analytical model wiII be developed based on 
Kapferer's "Identity PriSlll" (1992) and Rao and Ruekert's brand aIliance evaluation model (1994). 
This model will be used to select potential brands for a possible aIliance, evaluate this selection and 
track the alliance's value. Finally, we wiII discuss the Iimitations inherent in this work and will 
suggest potential future areas of research that would be of interest wiiliin the field of brand 
management. 
1. Introduction 
Academic research in the field of brands has mainly focused on the value and 
management of brands with an individual identity cIearly separate from others (Aaker 1991; 
KeIler 1993; Kapferer 1992), or on the brand as an asset that forms part of a complete 
portfolio of individual and interrelated brands that must be jointIy managed (Barwise and 
Robertson 1992; de Chernatony 1991; de Chernatony and McWilliam 1990). However, 
recent years have witnessed the launching of products that use two individual brands for the 
purpose of gaining a greater competitive advantage on the marketplace. This phenomenon 
is much more widespread than current research would seem to suggest, and the reality seems 
to indicate that this type of aIliances between companies wiII undergo unsuspected growth in 
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the years to come. It is estimated that the number of strategic brand alliances and other 
related programs, such as co-branding, dual branding (Karel 1991) or ingredient brand 
strategies (Norris 1992), will grow worldwide at arate of 40 percent ayear, primarily in 
consumer products, services and the component and/or ingredient sectors (Stewart 1995)1. 
In the U.S. and Europe this trend is obvious ifwe observe sorne ofthe new products on the 
market. There are Haagen-Dazs icecream with Bailey' s Irish Cream and Amaretto di 
Saronno; General Biscuits' "Lu" brand with Danone cream filling; Bulova Benetton watches, 
Cereal boxes with General Mills' brand names and Nestle corporate brand; Visa and Master 
Card credit cards with the U. S and European airline' s logos and names; or the creation of 
new product categories by combining the identity and image of two brands such as in the 
case of Y olka ice-cream (Frigo and Danone in Spain and Motta and Danone in France - both 
Frigo and Motta are local brands from Unilever). 
On the other hand, there is extensive literature on the subject of strategic alliances. 
However, it has mainly focused on alliances in production, technology transfers and 
distribution (Porter 1986; Porter and Puller 1986; Harrigan 1986; Hennart 1988; Pisano et 
al. 1988; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989; Ring and Van de Ven 1992), and to a les ser 
extent on the are a of joint research and development (Shapiro 1985; Shapiro and Grossman 
1986; Spencer 1986; Ouchi and Kremen Bolton 1988). Recent works on strategic alliances 
in the area of marketing do not even mention brand alliances (Shamdasani and Sheth 1995). 
In this respect, the literature on strategic alliances covers all processes from research and 
development up to joint exploitation of markets and distribution channels. Brand alliances 
effectively close the cyc\e of the value chain, as they are the last point of contact with the 
end customer and the critical phase for creating value for the company. However, since it 
is such a novel strategy, joint use of brands through brand alliances is a field that has still 
not been developed in depth by academic !iterature, and only very recently sorne work has 
been done to empirically support the benefits of brand alliances (see Park, Jun and Shocker 
1996). 
This paper will attempt to help fill this literature gap by analyzing and developing the 
concept ofthe brand alliance on the basis ofWilliamson's transaction cost theory (1985) and 
the brand identity models presented by Aaker (1996), Upshaw (1995) and Kapferer (1992). 
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In addition, it will discuss the problems inherent in this type of alliance, primarily as regards 
complementarily and consistency between the alliance brands and their strategic objectives. 
To this end, an analytical model will be developed based on Kapferer's "Identity Prism" 
(1994) and Rao and Ruekert's brand alliance evaluation model (1994). This model wi11 be 
used to select potential brands for a possible alliance, evaluate this selection and track the 
alliance's value. Finally, we will discuss the limitations inherent in this work, which are 
fundamentalIy due to the lack of empirical references that would be useful in comparing 
theoretical formulations and also indicate potential future areas of research that would be of 
interest within the field of brand management. 
2. Strategic Brand AlIianees: Coneepts and Definitions 
Strategic alliances can involve a wide variety of agreements through which two or 
more companies agree to join their resources to seek or achieve market opportunities or 
specific market objectives. These agreements may include joint production ventures, joint 
research and development ventures, technology transfer, direct investment, licenses and other 
types of agreements of cooperation and joint use of complementary and/or specific assets 
such as distribution channels and industrial property rights (Harrigan 1988; lorde and Teece 
1992; Gulati 1995; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). lorde and Teece (1992) define a 
strategic alliance as "a bilateral or multilateral relationship characterized by the commitment 
of two or more partner companies to a common objective". There is a large body of 
literature that documents the environmental motives and factors that explain the proliferation 
of this type of corporate relationship, including the growing national and international 
competition, reduced product life cycles, rapid technological change and dissemination, 
protectionist barriers, a considerable increase in research and development costs, and the high 
risks involved in launching new products and penetrating new markets (Contractor and 
Lorange 1988; Harrigan 1989; Hamel 1991). The objectives sought by companies through 
alliances are also varied and on occasion interconnected. Villeneuve and Kaufman (1992) 
indicate the following objectives: financing, risk diversification, access to new technologies 
and knowhow, access to new distribution channels and customer segments, access to 
productive capacity, creation of new productive capacity, preventing or limiting competition 
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and, on occasions, mgrging or acquiring the partner. Atik (1993) also adds the objective of 
enhancing reputation and credibility on the marketplace. 
The academic and business definitions of brand alliances and the products resulting 
from them are varied. According to Rao and Ruekert (1994), when two or more products 
with their own brand are integrated into one and the same product in which each keeps its 
original brand, they form products with associated brands that are perceived by the public 
as interrelated products. This brand relationship or alliance can either be via a physical 
product integration in which one product cannot be used or consumed without the other (as 
in the case of IBM and Intel), or via the promotion of complementary use in which the 
products can be consumed separately (as in the case of Coca-Cola and Bacardi Rum, or 
Whirlpool and Ariel). Therefore, within the concept of brand alliance, these authors al so 
inelude joint advertising in that, irregardless of the nature of the association, the perception 
that the two brands are linked to each other as a result of the joint advertising leads 10 the 
brand alliance phenomenon (Rao and Ruekert 1994). In this respect, Greagh (1994) also 
develops the concept of shared promotions between non-competitive and non-substitutive 
brands, which could be considered as an alliance of sorts aimed at acquiring greater 
recognition or mental impact, greater ability of incentivation and motivation and decreased 
promotion costs for the companies involved. 
Other authors, ineluding Carpenter (1994), McManus (1994), Lefton (1993), Lucas 
(1993) and Norris (1992), describe brand alliances as product "cobranding", defining them 
as the simultaneous use of two different brands in a new product or service for the purpose 
of enhancing the brand's value and image and differentiating the product and/or of entering 
or creating a new market segment. Park, Jun and Shocker (1996) use the term Composite 
Branding Alliances when a combination of two existing brand names is used as the brand 
name for a new product. According to aH these authors, the principal objective of brand 
alliances is focused more on developing or launching new products with their own identity 
than on the field of joint or complementary promotion of a product or service. This is the 
focus that we will use in this paper, and thus we will exclude typical shared promotions that, 
owing to their time dimension and repercussion on both brands, are more tactical than 
strategic. 
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On the other hand, alliances are also defined and classified on the basis of their 
organizational structure, i.e. whether or not there is an independent partnership and what 
type of agreement is established (vertical or horizontal). Thus, a differentiation can be made 
between strategic alliances strictly speaking, which are al so defined as contractual joint 
ventures, and equity joint ventures (Hennart 1988), in that the former do not require the 
constitution and joint ownership of a legally separate entity that exploits the technologies and 
assets targeted by the alliance. Brand alliances can be structured in any way. Based on the 
classifications of Hennart (1988), Pisano (1989), and Jarillo and Echezarraga (1991), we can 
find brand alliances in which no independent entity of brand owners is constituted and in 
which the alliance is legalized by means of a contract for the joint use of the asset, and those 
in which an independent legal entity is established to exploit the ownership rights of the new 
brand names and manage the new products developed under the brand alliance. The former 
case would be properly defined as a strategic alliance or contractual joint venture, which in 
the area of brands is primarily developed via brand licenses and ingredient brand policies, 
and the latter case would be an "equity joint venture", i.e. an independent entity in which the 
partners have shares in the capitaF. In addition, using Jarillo and Echezarraga's strategic 
alliance classification, brand alliances can be divided into the two basic types developed by 
these authors: horizontal type agreements (e.g., brand alliance between Danone and 
Unilever) or vertical type agreements (e.g., IBM and Intel - "Intel Inside" program, or 
NutraSweet and Coca-Cola). If we use the classifications of Varadarajan and Cunningham 
(1995), we can also find brand alliances in most of their industry, geographic and functional 
alliance' s classification. Thus, following their example of General Mills and Nestle, this 
could be classified as a brand strategic alliance between market follower (G.M. in U.S.) and 
market leader (Nestlé in Europe), a international brand alliance between a U.S. and European 
company, and from a functional scope perspective, may al so be considered a brand stractegic 
alliance involving joint product development and co-marketing functions. 
Irregardless of the organizational and contractual basis of the brand alliance, in the 
eyes of the consumer the resulting product or service will be clearly supported by two 
brands, either with a new name (such as the case of the new Yolka product of Danone and 
Unilever), or with a combined name or synthesis of the two brands (e.g., Peugeot 205 
Lacoste, American Airlines Visa Credit Card). In other words, the resulting product will 
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be a synthesis of two differentiated identities with the benefits and risks that this entails, 
although it is to be expected that an alliance between two brands will be implemented when 
it obviously benefits the consumer, the distribution channel and the companies (brand s) in 
question. 
3. Strategic Motivations Behind Brand Allianees 
There are different theories that explain the existence of complex economic 
organizations and institutions such as companies. The theory of transaction costs, which 
begins with Coase (1973) and is extensively developed in the works of Williamson (1975, 
1985, 1991), has beco me the dominant theory to explain the existence of companies in 
situations of imperfect competition, Le. why certain transactions are not carried out on the 
market and are internalized within the company. Based on the analysis of Wi11iamson's 
theory of transaction costs (1985), the new organizational forms represented by strategic 
a11iances can also be explained (Hennart 1988; Pisano 1989; Atik 1993). 
This type of organization appears as an intermediate point between the market and the 
corporate hierarchy (Thorelli 1986). The fact that it is being increasingly developed in a11 
types of sectors and transactions seems to indicate that in eertain circumstances and/or 
transaetions, this type of organization is superior or more efficient than exehanges made on 
the market and than internalization within a single company. Thus, it could be expected that 
eompanies wi11 establish this type of agreement when the transaction eosts assoeiated with 
a given exchange are intermediate and not high enough to justify vertical integration (Gulati 
1995). In addition, the type of allianee eontraet will more nearly approach either the market 
structure (contractual alliance or joint venture) or the hierarchy (equity joint venture) 
depending on the magnitude of the transactions costs: the higher the transaction costs, more 
hierarehieal wi11 the contraet be (Pisano 1989). Sinee the most important transaetion eost 
within an alliance is the possibility of the other partner displaying opportunistic behavior, this 
is effeetively minimized by a share in the alliance ownership structure (Doz, Hamel and 
Prahalad 1989; Kogut 1989; Gulati 1995). Therefore, in view of the risks associated with 
the a11ianee, the type of eontraet will reflect the risks pereeived by each partner. 
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According to Hennart (1988), strategic aJliances are formed to acquire or share assets 
with two main characteristics: i) they are company specific assets, in the sense that they 
cannot be easily dissociated from it, and ii) they are public goods, in the sense that they can 
be shared at a very low marginal cost. If the asset is a public good, it will then be more 
expensive to create or produce it than to purchase it, but if in addition it is a specific asset, 
it will also be more difficult to obtain independently of the other corporate assets. Hennart 
(1988) understands that a hybrid structure of the type found in strategic alliances can allow 
for jointly sharing/using these valuable assets, thus avoiding the unnecessary or unwanted 
purchase of other company assets. 
From this standpoint, brands could be considered as public goods, in that once the 
awareness, image and prestige of a brand are established, the additional costs of using it in 
other complementary or similar products would be very low or even negative, on the 
assumption that the new product helps to improve the brand's value and identity. Use of the 
brand in other categories of products would be a more problematic issue, as discussed in the 
literature on brand extension (Tauber 1981; Roberts and McDonald 1989; Aaker and Keller 
1990; Sullivan 1992; Sunde and Brodie 1993), since the negative aspects would have to be 
considered and consequently the costs that would be incurred if the extension failed. 
Likewise, brands are company specific assets, more from a marketing than from a 
legal point of view, since legally the brand property rights can be sold without having to sell 
any other company asset and therefore, as they can be sold independently of the rest of the 
company's operations, they would not be specific to the company. However, from a 
marketing perspective and of brand valuation aboye and beyond its legal entity, the brand can 
be a very company specific asset as it is directly linked to company resources and 
capabilities. In fact, brands synthesize for the market and the consumer the series of 
competitive advantages embodied in the organization's products and services. The brand's 
value and identity are formed by a series of interrelated facets that emanate from the 
organization itself (Aaker 1991, 1996; Upshaw 1995; Kapferer 1992). Thus, since the 
brand's value and identityare sustained by the organization's resources and capabilities, its 
acquisition by a third party can only result in competitive advantages if the purchasing 
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company has the resources aRd capabilities to maintain and increase the value of the 
purchased brand. Otherwise, the advantage that the brand can provide will only be short-
term, until the market and the consumers see that their expectations of the brand are not 
being fulfilled3 • By means of a brand alliance, each partner has access to and share in the 
value and synthesis of meanings of the other partner's brand, and in the case of equity joint 
ventures a "quasi-internalization" of each partner's resources and capabilities may even be 
attained. 
The reasons for establishing a brand alliance may to a certain extent be inductively 
postulated by asking why this institutional mode of shared access is preferable to market 
contracts (brand purchase or brand single license) and/or internalization (brand extension or 
creation of own brand). The increasing use of brand allianees seems to minimize transaetion 
costs under certain cireumstances, and at the same time they sustain the monopolistie returns 
that these specifie assets generate, since the trademark property rights of eaeh brand continue 
to be independently linked to each one of the companies. 
Brand allianees offer one more alternative to traditional brand strategies and 
furthermore they are constituted within a inter-eompany cooperation mechanism that may go 
beyond the joint use or utilization of brands, depending on the degree of strategic 
commitment acquired by each brand. Therefore, to launch a new product or enter a new 
category, the company can choose between several alternatives: internally create a new 
brand or extend one of the existing brands in its portfolio (internalization), or purchase or 
license a brand on the marketplaee that is suited to the new produet or eategory (market 
contract)o Between these two situations, the spectrum may include licensing a famous brand 
on the market or legalizing an agreement with another brand to develop and launch the 
product on the market jointly with the company's own brand (allianee). We will analyze 
below each of these alternatives. 
3.1 Purchasing or Licensing a Famous Brand 
In the purehase or licensing of a famous brand, there are very important costs of 
negotiation and information asymmetry stemming from the problems of brand valuation. The 
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selling company may perceive the asset value very differently than the purchasing company. 
In fact, the brand may have a different value for each of the potential purchasers or licensees 
(Wood 1995). The value of a new brand for the company will depend on how easy it is to 
integrate it into its brand portfolio, its relation to the organization' s distinctive competencies 
and the synergies that it can create with other corporate brand s and/or products (Barwise and 
Robertson 1992). In addition, information asymmetry is important since it is the brand 
owner and not the potential purchaser or Iicensee who best knows the real value of the brand 
and its market strengths and weaknesses. On the other hand, in addition to information 
asymmetries, we should add the lack of universally accepted evaluation methods both in the 
area of marketing and in the economic-financial field, which complicates even more the 
negotiation process. Furthermore, in the case of a brand license, there is always the 
underIying possibility of opportunistic behavior by one of the partners. It is the owner in the 
end who maintains control of the brand, and it can affect the brand value through its 
communication policy or product quality. For example, it can affect the license value ex post 
facto by cutting back on investment in brand communication. The licensee can also affect 
the brand value if it does not comply with contractual obligations and clauses, which would 
consequently increase the costs of monitoring and fulfilling the contract terms4 • An 
additional problem would be finding a brand that actually has all the attributes that the 
company strategically needs to successfully launch the new product. As Kapferer (1992) 
indicates, there are very few brands in which all facets of identity are well developed, and 
therefore on so me occasions (such as alliances) these weakness must be supplemented with 
attributes embodied in other brands. 
Finally, as regards the alternative of purchasing a famous brand on the market, there 
is a problem linked to the company's financial ability to undertake the acquisition. The 
strategy of acquiring very famous brands has undoubtedly been widely used by companies 
in recent years (Murphy 1990; Barwise and Robertson 1992; Kapferer 1992). However, on 
analyzing the amounts involved in these acquisitions and the economic appraisals made by 
consulting firms of the major brandss, it is obvious that this option is limited to large 
corporations, which take advantage of the strong leveraging of their brand portfolios and 
distribution channels to generate important synergies between their brands. In any event, due 
to the associated information asymmetries mentioned aboye, the question always remains of 
9 
whether the price paid is higher or lower than the investment required to launch a brand of 
similar characteristics6 • 
3.2 Launching a New Brand or Brand Extension 
At the other end of the spectrum, the company has the alternative of launching a new 
brand on the market or undertaking a brand extension. In the former case, brand 
internalization may involve very high costs for the company. Creation of a brand with 
market power is the result of a timely accumulative process and considerable investments. 
It is not easy to create a prestigious brand that also commands recognition in all markets, or 
even more that has reputation and credibility (Semprini 1995; Kapferer 1992; Herbig and 
Milewicz 1993; Aaker 1991). This is a time consuming process that requires a constant, 
considerable investment in product innovation and communication, as well as adequate 
management of its overall value and identity. In addition to the necessary investments, an 
additional weakness of this strategy is the slow rate of product penetration and dissemination 
on the market. In a marketplace characterized by rapid, aggressive competition, many 
companies cannot strategically afford the time required to consolidate a new brand in a given 
segment or category and must use the value and strength of an already established brand. 
011 the other hand, and this is an additional problem when deciding whether to create a new 
brand, success is not guaranteed beforehand and the risk is always high, as demonstrated by 
the failure rates in launching new products and brands on the marketplace (Crawford 1977; 
Booz, ABen and Hamilton 1982; Murphy 1987; Aaker and Keller 1990; Bissell 1994; Bossu 
1995). 
Finally there is the brand extension strategy, which in principIe would be the most 
logical alternative for most companies. From a strategic point of view, the company will 
select those products-markets where it can most effectively use and exploit its competitive 
advantages, even when this decision leads to a "second best choice" (Bakker et al. 1994). 
Recent literature on strategic management has identified the brand as an intangible asset 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Coyne 1986; Itami and Roehl 1987; Barzel 
1989; Aaker 1989; Hall 1992; Mahoney and Pandian 1992, among others). A fundamental 
feature of brands is that they are susceptible to multiple, simultaneous uses in accordance 
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with the public good nature of information (ltami and Roehl 1987), and they are liable to 
offer potential access to a wide range of markets. This multiple use of the brand and the 
strategy of exploitation and accumulation of its value will often explain the choice to 
diversify the company and to transfer and use this asset in related business activities 
(Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Lemelin 1982; Prescott and Visscher 1980). Thus, a brand 
with market value offers the possibility of being used via brand extension for entry into new 
markets and new product categories. 
Brand extension is the strategy most used by companies in recent years, as indicated 
by the analyses of Buday (1989) and Kapferer (1992). There are several reasons for the 
growing use of extensions: the high rate of failure of new brands on the market, reduced 
R&D investments in new products, economies of scale in communication and promotion, 
greater ease in gaining distribution and shelf space, and competitive pressures to launch new 
products on the market (Tauber 1981, 1988; Roberts and McDonald 1989; Hastings 1990; 
Aaker 1991; Kapferer 1992). In short, they facilitate the introduction of new products while 
reducing inherent risks and costs. Another fundamental purpose of an extension may be that 
it has a multiplying effect that increases and accumulates the brand's value (Aaker 1991). 
The decision to extend is primarily evaluated by determining the suitability of the 
perceived quality and reputation of the brand in its original context to the new category 
(Aaker and Keller 1990; Sunde and Brodie 1993), the complementarily of products and 
transferability of technological knowhow (Tauber 1988), and the suitability and coherence 
of the brand's identity in the new category (Kapferer 1992; Upshaw 1995). Nevertheless, 
as indicated by Aaker (1991) and Kapferer (1992), brand extensions can also have neutral 
effects, create negative associations or attributes in the new product and even damage the 
brand's value and image in its original context. As we have mentioned aboye, the negative 
aspects and costs would have to be considered if the extension failed. As Itami and Roehl 
(1987) pointed out, on occasions it is incompatible to use the brand as input and output in 
company operations. 
Limits on brand extension are imposed by the very concept of brand identiti, which 
goes beyond the sphere of technological knowhow and quality attributes and encompasses 
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other facets such as culture, relations, positioning and personality of the brand. Defining the 
brand identity, its strengths and weaknesses, and its perception in the market (brand image 
analysis), is the basis for managing its communication and extension to other product 
categories. Furthermore, knowing the brand's identity is the prior phase required to develop 
a suitable brand strategy consistent with the corporate marketing strategy (Kapferer 1992; 
Upshaw 1995; Aaker 1996). Thus, the concept of identity reminds us that the brand cannot 
access all categories and/or positions. With time, the brand develops its symbols and 
communications and acquires its own autonomy, meaning and territory, and consequently its 
own territorial limits. For this reason, the brand identity prohibits certain extensions and 
ensures others. In those cases in which identity analysis does not permit or ensure the 
success of the extension or endangers the brand's value in its original context, the company 
will have to develop another brand strategy to enter the new product category. 
Thus, if we analyze the brand identity of Lacoste and Benetton brand names and the 
attributes/facets that constitue the meaning of these two brands, we can observe how these 
facets will limit in which product categories each brand can extend. So, the caractheristics 
of young, creative and social criticism of the Benetton brand, do not al\ow it to enter the 
category of formal and classic clothing. However, the Lacoste brand could perfectly extend 
to this category. 
4. Basic PrincipIes of a Bl"and Allianee Strategy 
Due to the information asymmetries and negotiating costs involved in purchasing or 
licensing brands, the necessary eeonomie investments, the high rates of failure in launehing 
new brands and brand extensions, the increasingly high eosts of introducing a new brand in 
the market, the eompetitive pressures involved in launching and disseminating products, and 
the limitations that the very brand identities impose on extensions, companies are increasingly 
foreed lO develop shared brand strategies and brand allianees. 
The reasons are different in eaeh case, although the benefits and synergies sought are 
the same (Carpenter 1994; McMacus 1994; Lefton 1993; Lucas 1993; Norris 1992): higher 
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added value and buying confidence for the customer, enhanced product differentiation, 
diversification and reduction of the risks of developing and launching new products, 
economies of scale in marketing, generatíon of synergíes between two brands to create a 
value hígher than the individual sum of the two, accumulation of market value for each 
brand, and greater leverage with the distribution channel8• In addition, if the alliance is an 
equity joint venture, other additional benefits may originate from the economies of scale in 
production and R&D, as well as from the organizational learning effects (Hamel, 1991). 
Carpenter (1994) makes the following recommendations for successfully developing 
a brand alliance: 
1. Seek brands and companies that offer complementarily with the product in question. 
The relationship between the two brands and the new product must provide more 
meaning to the product, i.e. open a new market segment for the product or strengthen 
the product's position in its current markets/segments9• 
2. Develop brand alliances whose resulting product offers greater added value and is 
more desirable and convincing to the customer. 
3. Treat both brands equally as regards advertising, packaging or any other product 
promotion measure. 
These three principies must be based on mutual trust and convenience between both 
brands (MeManus 1994)10, as well as on establishing common long-term objectives, 
displaying the same enthusiasm for the joint projeet, eompatibility of payment dates in the 
distribution ehannel and willingness to make the investments required to sustain the joint 
brand's growth and value (Stewart, 1995). Again, the possibility of opportunistie behavior 
in this type of allianee always exists, although it will be minimized as the allianee 
inereasingly internalizes the partners (equity joint venture type allianees). 
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Furthermore, brand alliances contain the basic characteristics to provide the partners 
with a sustainable competitive advantage. The nuclear source of this sustainable advantage 
are the two (or more) intangible assets involved in the alliance: the brands. Brands fulfil with 
an alliance the five conditions pointed out by Day (1995). They are legal rights (e.g., 
trademarks) and relational assets (e.g., brand equity, brand identity) that provide value to the 
customers and other company stakeholders, show negative depreciation if managed properly 
and therefore are durable, legally protected from imitation and duplication, and embedded 
with a high degree of causal ambiguity, both to competitors and to sorne degree to the brand 
owners. All these conditions are synergistic multiply through a brand alliance if the brands 
are complementary and the partners have the commitment to increase value in the alliance. 
5. Evaluation of Brand Allianees 
Rao and Ruekert (1994) developed an analytical model based on the concepts and 
principIes of strategic alliances between companies and on the concept of "economies of 
information", in order to study and analyze the suitability of a brand alliance and predict the 
success of this decision. Based on the concept of the brand as product quality indicator and 
assurance, Rao and Ruekert argue that the presence of a second brand in a product should 
likewise constitute an indicator of at least the same, if not of a higher, level of quality as that 
of the other product brand. From this point of view, Rao and Ruekert believe that the 
fundamental aspect of brand value is perceived quality, where this is understood to be the 
perception that consumers have of quality in general or of product or service superiority over 
other competitive products or services. The importance of the perceived quality variable 
to the brand's value and to other company assets and variables has been analyzed and 
validated by several authors by using the PIMS databas e (Buzzel and Gale 1987, and 
Jacobson and Aaker 1987). In addition, Kirmani and Zeithaml (1993) determine, on the 
basis of different studies and investigations made by other authors, that the brand (brand-
name) is frequently the signal that is most commonly used from among intrinsic and extrinsic 
signals to determine product quality. On the basis of these studies and of Aaker's brand 
val ue anal ys is (1991), it can be argued that the model developed by Rao and Ruekert, based 
on the perceived quality of brands and the use of a second brand as an additional quality 
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signal, is an acceptable analytical model for evaluating the suitability and utility of a brand 
alliance. 
According to the Rao and Ruekert model and its classification of products into 
products with internal "non-contrastable" qualities and products with external "contrastable" 
qualities (or with a very low experimentation risk), brand alliances are formed for the former 
type of product to emphasize and ensure the quality perception and assure the consumer that 
product quality is reaP 1, and for the latter type to provide the consumer with information on 
the existence of additional and/or complementary attributes that make the final product more 
attractive. In the former case, the alliance will be formed between one brand that needs to 
communicate and assure its quality to the market and another brand that already has this 
reputation for quality (e.g., SEAT and Porsche). In the latter case, the alliance will be 
established between one brand that needs attributes that are difficult to develop or purehase 
and another brand that possesses these sought after attributes, knowhow or functions (e.g., 
IBM and Intel, Sony and Dolby, Benetton and Bulova). 
For Rao and Ruekert (1994), the purpose of alliances is to profitably improve the 
perception of quality. However, the brand's value (and by definition its identityand image) 
has a much broader meaning than perceived quality. The brand's market value includes the 
concepts of quality, value and attitudes, as well as brand associations, personality, culture 
and other kinds of feelings. In other words, the concept of brand equity and identity is more 
multidimensional than perceived quality and therefore is at a much higher level of abstraction 
(Kirmani and Zeithaml 1993). In fact, in Kapferer' s Identity Model, product quality is one 
but not the only source that configurates and create the brand identity. In faet, in many 
product categories, communication (mainly advertising) is a source of brand value more 
important than real product quality. 
Thus, the Rao and Ruekert model can explain the alliance of Benetton with Bulova 
(watches) but not the Timex (watches) and Timberland (boots and shoes) alliance. In the 
case of Benetton, the brand did not have the technical knowhow attributes required for 
extension to the watch category and needed the alliance with Bulova to be able to transmit 
the quality attribute and combine it with the design and color attributes. In this same realm, 
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the Camel brand did not have these technical attributes either, but it did possess other 
dimensions of brand personality, culture and image that were qualitatively superior than the 
technical attributes, thus permitting a successful brand extension to the watch category. 
Timex, on the other hand, commands the technical attributes and quality perception in this 
category, but unlike Camel, its own brand identity did not allow it to enter the segment of 
sports-adventure watches and it had to join its brand with Timberland to do so. Therefore, 
when evaluating the necessity and suitability of brand allianees and their possibilities of 
success, it will be necessary to develop a model that more fully addresses the 
multidimensional nature of the brand. 
Furthermore, the Rao and Ruekert model (1994) is a static, ex post facto model, i.e. 
once it has been decided what secondary brand could be the ally, the suitability of this 
alliance is evaluated. However, a preliminary phase for any kind of alliance is to determine 
the need for a joint launching with another brand, select the possible allied brand and, once 
the selection and alliance are made, evaluate and strategically manage the alliance on the 
basis of the identity and image of the joint product and/or brand resulting from the alliance, 
analyzing whether this identity reflects the communication and positioning philosophy and 
strategy being sought. 
In this respect, we believe that the brand identity models developed by Kapferer 
(1992), Upshaw (1995), and Aaker (1996) more accurately address the multidimensional 
brand concept. Together with the Rao and Ruekert evaluation model (1994) and Aaker's 
brand value management model (1991), they can serve as the basis for establishing a 
conceptual brand alliance selection and evaluation mode!. For this paper, we have selected 
Kapferer' s "Identity Prism" model (1992), because of its graphic representation and because 
we consider that it does not differ substantially from the Aaker and Upshaw models. This 
conceptual model is shown in Figure 3. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
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The Identity analysis is used to examine the brand in detail and observe its strengths 
and weaknesses. In this respect, this analysis is much more thorough than those limited 
solely to the external appearance of the brand and image, or those based on perception and 
positioning of the brand. The identity analysis provides information on the different facets 
of the brand and in which ones the brand has a greater competitive advantage as well as its 
main disadvantages when the brand has to enter a new category, allowing us to consider the 
need of a second brand and define what the characteristics of a potential allied brand should 
be. This brand would have to remedy or cover the weakest parts reflected in the identity 
analysis, as well as leverage its core advantages. 
Once this analysis is performed for the primary brand, the following phase would be 
to select the possible allied brands. For this selection, an identity analysis similar to the one 
performed for the primary brand would have to be carried out for each potential aIliance 
brand. The ideal alliance would be one formed between brands that complement and remedy 
their weaknesses and develop and consolidate their strengths. Therefore, the selected allied 
brand would be one that covers up the weak areas of the primary brand (if there are any) and 
complements the other areas of the Prism without conflicting with its position and image. 
This complementarily can be evaluated with the Rao and Ruekert model, either in general 
terms based on perceived quality or else (and more preferable) in relation to the dimension 
or attribute to be leveraged in the aIliance. 
This model also suggests that the respective identities and positions of both brands 
should be respected and the power and image of each brand in the new product or service 
should be adequately appraised. As Carpenter indicates in his analysis of Intel's alliances 
with computer brands, when one brand is linked to another with a much greater value, the 
former may to a certain extent become covered up or overshadowed by the latter's power and 
image. For example, in many branded cronic-computers, their brands go unnoticed because 
of the famous "Intel Inside" logo. In the case of the new Yolka frozen yoghurt, there is an 
almost perfect balance between the Danone and Unilever brands (Frigo in Spain and Motta 
in France); the complementary attributes that each brand needs are found in the other, both 
are leaders in their respective categories, and the two logos and brands are displayed with 
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the same size and in the same location on the packaging, thus offering a quasi-perfect 
balance. 
Finally, once the alliance is formalized, a mechanism must be established to protect 
and accumulate value in each alliance brand and to evaluate and manage the alliance proper. 
This alliance evaluation must be a dynamic feedback process that permits appropriate 
adjustments in the sources of brand identity, in order to fashion the message conveyed by the 
alliance (or by its respective brand s) for the purpose of establishing the alliance brand's value 
and identity and the competitive advantages sought through the alliance. 
6. Conclusions 
In the years to come, a significant increase is expected in the launching of products 
and services under brand alliances. These alliances will be of different kinds: consumer 
product brand alliances (e.g., Frigo and Danone, Coca Cola and Nestle, Bulova and 
Benetton), ingredient brand alliances (e.g., Intel and IBM, NutraSweet and Coca Cola, 
Haagen-Dazs and Baileys), service sector alliances (e.g., Visa and American Airlines, 
MasterCard and AT &T, Shell and MasterCard) and alliances of retailers/distributors brands 
with other companies (e.g., 7 Eleven and MCI, and alliances at the European and North 
American level between credit cards and the large retailers). These alliances will become 
what Bossu (1995) calls "win-win product relations", in that they improve the products' 
competitive advantage by combining and complementing the competitive advantages of both 
brands. 
As discussed hereinabove, the risk of launching new products and brands on the 
market is increasingly high, but it is necessary for companies to survive. Brand alliances, the 
result of mutual trust and convenience between two companies and of complementarily 
between the identities of two brands, offer the opportunity of spreading the risk and, of even 
strategically more important, the possibility of attaining important synergies for strengthening 
the value and image of both brands to offer greater added value to the customer, which will 
lead to a greater competitive advantage on the market. 
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The conceptual model developed herein synthesizes the most current concepts and 
valuations of the brand and, more than a reference model, it is intended to be a model that 
encourages academic discussion and allow for in-depth study of this new, emerging area of 
marketing. 
7. Limitations and Areas of Potential Interest 
As we mentioned in the introduction, a limitation on this work and in general on this 
area of marketing is the lack of empirical references that permit a comparison of the ideas, 
models and theoretical postulates set forth herein. On one hand, this is a novel subject in 
brand management and policy with scant academic references. Most references in this area 
are found in professional journals that do not have the required academic rigor and depth. 
On the other hand, although this type of strategy is increasingly forming part of corporate 
marketing decisions, there is still not a significant number of constituted alliances that would 
permit in-depth quantitative and qualitative analyses on the basis of which models and 
theories could be developed. In this respect, an initial area of investigation in this field will 
be a followup, with in-depth qualitative analyses and case studies, of the relevant brand 
alliances being established in our countries, in order to create a suitable database that can be 
used lO aeeurately analyze the strategie advantages (positioning, image, trademarks, patents, 
etc.) aehieved by the allianee, as well as other significant variables such as market shares, 
investments made and profits obtained. 
On the other hand, joint brand use is also obvious in other areas of eorporate 
deeision-making, sueh as in eompany merger and takeover processes and processes of 
rationalizing product and brand portfolios within a company. Following is a brief summary 
of the circumstances of these two situations. 
Mergers al1d Acquisitions 
The use of two brands in a sigle product has also been employed as a product 
adaptation policy in processes of company mergers and acquisitions. For example, when the 
North American firm Whirlpool purchased European Philips' appliance division, the 
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purchase contract contained an agreement to use the Philip' s brand for a period of ten years. 
New Whirlpool products were progressively introduced into Europe by using the two brand s 
in all products marketed during the early years (first "Philips Whirlpool" and later 
"Whirlpool Philips"). Once Whirlpool was well enough known in the sector, the Philips 
brand was abandoned. Black & Decker's purchase of General Electric's small appliances 
division in 1984, and Nestle' s purchase of Unilever' s refrigerated products division in 
Europe (LRF) in 1985 are similar cases. In the latter case, the "Creola" products ofLRF and 
"Chamby" Chambourcy products of Nestlé, respective leaders in different countries, were 
gradually merged to end up with the "Creola of Chambourcy" brand. 
Corporate Product and Brand Portfolio Rationalization 
In order to establish stable, low prices policies, one of the strategies used by sorne 
multinational companies such as Procter & Gamble in the last few years has been to 
rationalize their brand portfolio by withdrawing sorne of their brands from the market and 
repositioning others, and combining sorne of their secondary or "weak" brand s with their 
stronger ones. In the latter case, the brands are combined into a single brand, such as the 
cornbination of the oil brands Puritan and Crisco, to become the Crisco Puritan brand. This 
policy is used to reduce the cost of rnaintaining different brands without running the risk of 
losing each brand' s loyal customers. 
1. See Stewart, A.L. "Cobranding just starting in Europe", Marketing News, March 1995, p. 5. Also, in a 
market research undertaken in June 1994 by Scarbourough Custom Research in the U .S.A., interviewing 89 
leading brand managers in different product categories, a 39 % answered that in the next years, they will use 
hrand alliances in order to increase l1larket share and il1lprove their cOl1lpetitive position. See Benezra, K. "How 
They Plan to Reach Conswuers", Brandweek, July 25, 1994, p. 36. 
2. For example, in the fonller case we could situate ingredient brand alliances, such as the ones developed 
by Coca-Cola and Nutrasweet, or IBM and Intel. AIso, other alliances such as Peugeot 205-Lacoste, Ford-Eddie 
Bauer, American Airlines-Visa, and other based on joint promotion (Coca-Cola and Bacardi, Whirlpool and 
Arie!) would be classified in this category. Within brand alliances where an independent legal entity is 
established is the alliance between Unilever (with its different local European icecream brands) and Danone for 
the launching of Yolka' s frozen yoghurt, the alliance between Coca-Cola and N estlé for the launching of Nestea 
and Pepsico and Lipton for the launching of Liptonice. 
3. For example, the brand "Benetton" has such a strong image and reputation in the market so tllat, tlle brand 
itself, is a very important intangible asset for the company. The opening of a new shop with this brand will 
autol1latically pull in a good nwnber of potential customers. Rowever, the brand "Benetton" per se, is not the 
only source of competitive advantage for the company. The company' s competitive advantage resides in a 
combination of intercoilllected resources (Runt and Morgan, 1995). Those are the brand and the company' s 
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capabilities to manufactured and distributed new colorful fashion products with the design, quality and price 
expected and accepted in the market. These design, manufacturing and distribution capabilities have been 
developed through complex technological development processes, supplier networks and organizationallearning. 
These capabilities, that are specific of the Benetton organization, are also source of its competitive advantage. 
In this case, the role of the Benetton brand is to synthesize for the market and the consumer these capabilities 
and conilllUnicate the essence, identity, style, quality and variety of the organization' s products and services. 
In fact, the brand cOllilllUnicates the competitive advantages embodied in tbe Benetton organization. 
4. A c1ear exanIple is the case of the Lacoste brand in the USA. At the beginning of the eighties, the brand 
had a value, measured on sales volume, of approximately 500 million dollars. However, due that the U.S. 
licensee did not support the brand illlage (mainly marketing COllilllUlúcations and product quality), the brand fell 
to 60 million dolIars in 1992, losing its value and prestige image in the U .S. market and affecting its global 
value. See "Anelllic Crocodile", Forbes, August 15th, 1994, p. 116. 
5. To review a financial evaluation ofwelI-known brands, see for example Ourusoff, A. "Brands - What's Hot. 
What's Not", Financial World, August 2,1994, p. 40,44-46 and 48-50. 
6. As Barwise and Robertson (1992) pointed out, Ford's acquisition of Jaguar may promise some of the 
advantages of leveraging brand portfolios, but the issue remains whether Ford overpaid. Competitor Toyota built 
its brand portfolio in the car prelllium brand seglllent with the launching of Lexus for an estilllated $2.0 billion, 
versus Ford' s acquisition price of $2.6 billion plus some $2.0 billion further investment to upgrade Jaguar' s 
quality and technology to reach world class standards. Without question, the Jaguar brand have a high cachet. 
"but perhaps not enough to justify the price Ford paid". See Barwise. P. and Robertson. T. "Brand Portfolios", 
European Managelllent Journal. Vol. 10, nO 3, September 1992, p. 278. 
7. Brand identity is the configuration of words. images. ideas, and associations that fonu a consumer' s 
aggregate perception of a brand. Brand identity is part of the total brand equity. but it refers to that part of the 
equity that reaches outward to offer benefits that lllake it more attractive as the object of a possible purchase. 
Brand idemity is a product of the melding of a brand' s positioning and personality, and is played out in the 
product/service perfonllance. the brand name. its logo and graphic system. the brand' s marketing 
conilllUlúcations. and in other ways in which the brand comes into contact with its constituencies. For a in depth 
analysis of the concept of brand identity, brand valuation and brand equity see Upshaw, L. B. (1995): Building 
Brand Identity, John Wiley and Son. Inc. 
8. Brand alliances facilitate the access to distribution chanuels, in the sense that distributors can obtain higher 
operating profits (through product differentiation not based on price). higher product turnover. an additional 
prolllotion factor (a second brand on the product) and reduce uncertainty at the time to place a new product on 
the shelf. because the product wiII be supported by two cOlllpalúes (two brands) instead of one. 
9. The cOlllplelllemary principIe in strategic alliances is the main characteristic of the alliances described by 
Bleeke and Ernst (1995) as "AlIiances of Complementary Equals". These type of alliances refer to the lllarket 
power equilibrium among the partners as weII as the complementariety of their business (product and 
technology) and strategies. Of the six types of alliances described by these authors, tIús type enjoys the higher 
possibilities of success and long tenll existence. Among other examples, tIIe authors pointed out tIIe alliance of 
Pepsico and Lipton for the development and selling of tea based drinks, joilúng the distribution power and brand 
illlage of Pepsico in beverages and the know-how. manufacturing experience and brand image of Lipton in the 
tea sector. See Bleeke. J. and Ernst. D. "ls Your Strategic Alliance ReaIIy a Sale? Harvard Business Review. 
January-February. 1995. pp. 97-105. 
10. As Arrow (1974) indicates. trust is perhaps the most efficient mechanism for the management of economic 
transactions. Trust among partners can reaIIy expand the possibilities and coverage of the aIIiance and allow 
the partner cOlllpalúes to enter in new colIaborative agreelllents, that otherwise would be impossible to establish, 
even with the most detailed lllanagelllent and control contracts. 
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11. This situation was observable when the Spalúsh automaker SEA T launched its first in-house designed and 
manufactured car (SEAT Ibiza), after departing from its forroer licensor FIAT. Product information and 
communication emphasized the Porsche designed engine of the new car, utilizing the quality positioning and 
prestige of the Gernlan brand as a quality guarantee for the new mode!. 
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